01367nas a2200169   4500008004100000245008200041210006900123260000900192300001200201490000700213520078900220653001201009653001701021100001801038700001701056856012401073       2009                        eng d00aCorporate Governance and Capital Accumulation: Firm Level Evidence from Italy0 aCorporate Governance and Capital Accumulation Firm Level Evidenc  c2009  a634-6610 v563 aThis study investigates the impact of investor protection on firm ownership and investment decisions in a model where investor protection is allowed to vary across firms. Using firm panel data for Italy, we construct firm level variables to capture the degree of investor protection which is specific to the firm and observable by outside shareholders. Empirical evidence indicates that the stronger the investor protections the lower the fraction of equity that is owned by insiders. Results also suggest that higher insider equity ownership is linked to a larger risk premium and higher costs of capital for the firm. Finally, our findings indicate that the magnitude of capital stock distortions is important when shareholder protection is weak and ownership concentration is high.10aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aRondi, Laura  uhttps://stage.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/corporate-governance-and-capital-accumulation-firm-level-evidence-italy-0