01319nas a2200181   4500008004100000245005400041210005400095260000900149490000600158520076400164653001200928653001700940100001800957700001700975700003000992710001801022856009701040       2014                        eng d00aExecutive Compensation and Agency Issues in Italy0 aExecutive Compensation and Agency Issues in Italy  c20140 v53 aFrom a theoretical perspective, we posit that that dividend policies may be relevant in resolving agency issues even in a governance environment dominated by family controlled ﬁrms. Earlier research has found that in more market based systems such as the US and Canada, dividends are in fact instrumental in solving agency issues. Prior empirical research has also found that dividends have a role in mitigating agency conﬂicts in a bank-dominated corporate environments like that in Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). This paper extends the ﬁndings of earlier research by empirically investigating whether dividends retain their importance as the mechanism for resolving residual agency issues in a family controlled governance environment like Italy10aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aRondi, Laura1 aBhattacharyya, Nalanaksha1 aEmptyAuthNode  uhttps://stage.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/executive-compensation-and-agency-issues-italy01367nas a2200169   4500008004100000245008200041210006900123260000900192300001200201490000700213520078900220653001201009653001701021100001801038700001701056856012401073       2009                        eng d00aCorporate Governance and Capital Accumulation: Firm Level Evidence from Italy0 aCorporate Governance and Capital Accumulation Firm Level Evidenc  c2009  a634-6610 v563 aThis study investigates the impact of investor protection on firm ownership and investment decisions in a model where investor protection is allowed to vary across firms. Using firm panel data for Italy, we construct firm level variables to capture the degree of investor protection which is specific to the firm and observable by outside shareholders. Empirical evidence indicates that the stronger the investor protections the lower the fraction of equity that is owned by insiders. Results also suggest that higher insider equity ownership is linked to a larger risk premium and higher costs of capital for the firm. Finally, our findings indicate that the magnitude of capital stock distortions is important when shareholder protection is weak and ownership concentration is high.10aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aRondi, Laura  uhttps://stage.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/corporate-governance-and-capital-accumulation-firm-level-evidence-italy-001377nas a2200169   4500008004100000245009100041210006900132260000900201300001200210490000700222520078800229653001201017653001701029100001801046700001701064856012601081       2007                        eng d00aShareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from German and Italian Firms0 aShareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital Evidence from Ger  c2007  a153-1720 v183 aWe investigate the interaction of investor protection, ownership concentration and firms’ financing and investment decisions in a model where investor protection is allowed to vary across firms. Using firm panel data for Italy, we construct firm level variables to capture the degree of investor protection which is specific to the firm and observable by outside shareholders. We find that the stronger the investor protections the lower the fraction of equity that is owned by insiders. We also find that the higher the insider equity ownership the higher the idiosyncratic risk premium in the cost of capital. Finally, our results indicate that the magnitude of capital stock distortions is quite important when shareholder protection is weak and ownership concentration is high.10aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aRondi, Laura  uhttps://stage.business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/shareholder-protection-and-cost-capital-evidence-german-and-italian-firms-0