Dina Ribbink

541-706-2180

dina.ribbink@osucascades.edu

People and Faculty

Dina Ribbink

Overview

Background

Publications

Overview

Career Interests

Dina Ribbink is an Assistant Professor of Operations Management at the College of Business at Oregon State University – Cascades.

Dina's primary focus in research is on contractual buyer-supplier relationships, especially in international relationships. She researches in the fields of food supply chains as well as supply chains of emergency relief aid organizations. Dina’s research has been published in top tier journals in the field like the Journal of Operations Management and Transportation Journal, among others.

Background

Education

Dina Ribbink received her Ph.D. from the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland in 2010. Dina earned her MS in Business Administration from Maastricht University, the Netherlands. Before joining the faculty at OSU-Cascades, Dina was at the Ivey Business School at Western University, Canada.

Publications

Academic Journal

Supply Chain

“Revenue sharing bids of a loss-averse supplier for a new product development contract: A multi-method investigation”

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Academic Journal

Supply Chain

“Effectiveness of Bonus and Penalty Incentive Contracts in Supply Chain Exchanges: Does National Culture Matter?”

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of national culture on the effectiveness of bonus and penalty contract incentive structures in supply chain exchanges. We conduct laboratory experiments in Canada, China, and South Korea, involving transactional exchanges in which suppliers are presented with either bonus or penalty contracts. We then evaluate suppliers’ contract acceptance, effort level, and shirking comparatively across national culture. Our findings reveal critical cultural influences on contract efficacy. We show that while acceptance of bonus contracts is comparable across cultures, suppliers from Canada, associated with a national culture low in power distance and high in humane orientation, exhibit lower acceptance rates on penalty contracts. We also find some evidence that suppliers associated with collectivist cultures reward bonus contracts with greater effort and less shirking, but that these relationships are more complex. When contract effectiveness is compared across bonus and penalty contracts within a given cultural setting, we find that bonus contracts are accepted more than penalty contracts in all three countries. Also, after contracts are accepted, bonus contracts are more successful in China as suppliers exert higher efforts and shirk less under bonus contracts than penalty contracts, while accepted contracts are nearly indistinguishable in Canada and South Korea.

Details

Academic Journal

Supply Chain

“Incentivizing Supplier Participation in Buyer Innovation: Experimental Evidence of Non-Optimal Contractual Behaviors”

Original equipment manufacturers increasingly involve suppliers in new product development (NPD) projects. How companies design a contract to motivate supplier participation is an important but under-examined empirical question. Analytical studies have started to examine the optimal contract that aligns buyer-supplier incentives in joint NPD projects, but empirical evidence is scarce about the actual contracts offered by buying companies. Bridging the analytical and empirical literature, this paper compares optimal contracting derived from a parsimonious analytical model with actual behaviors observed in an experiment. In particular, we focus on how project uncertainty, buying company effort share, and buyer risk aversion influence three contractual decisions: total investment level, revenue share and fixed fee. Our results indicate significant differences between the optimal and actual behaviors. We identify various types of non-optimal contractual behaviors, which we explain from a risk aversion as well as a bounded rationality perspective. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature by showing that (1) the actual contractual behaviors could differ significantly from the optimal ones, (2) the actual contract design is sensitive to changes in project uncertainty and buying company effort share, and (3) the significant roles of risk aversion and bounded rationality in explaining the non-optimal contractual behaviors.

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Other

Supply Chain

“Honda Canada”

Honda Canada (A): Tsunami and Communications, Ivey Publishing 9B16D004 Honda Canada (B): Tsunami and Sourcing Disruption, Ivey Publishing 9B16D005 Teaching Note: Ivey Publishing 8B16004

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